Absence of pure Nash equilibria in a class of co-ordination games
Abstract
We prove that for a certain class of co-ordination games with increasing payoffs for co-ordination there are not necessarily pure Nash equilibria. This is achieved by introducing a particular model for the payoffs. This result is in contrast to the congestion game with decreasing payoff. We discuss a generalization of the model introduced which is of independent interest.
Published
2013-12-01
How to Cite
Cannings, C., & Cannings, R. (2013). Absence of pure Nash equilibria in a class of co-ordination games. Statistics, Optimization & Information Computing, 1(1), 1-7. https://doi.org/10.19139/soic.v1i1.10
Issue
Section
Research Articles
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